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r E s u m E n
Este artículo analiza los rasgos de la concepción de la memoria de Kant, los cuales 
él describió explícitamente en sus lecciones sobre antropología e implícitamente en la 
edición A de la Crítica de la Razón Pura. Proporcionaré una revisión de la literatura sobre 
la concepción de Kant acerca de la memoria hasta el presente. Sugiero que la memoria 
es una facultad cognitiva que tiene el poder de almacenar y reproducir representacio-
nes. Kant distingue tres tipos diferentes de memorización, los cuales son relevantes 
para el conocimiento humano. Asimismo, proporciono razones para sostener que la 
imaginación y la memoria deben ser diferenciadas por su funcionamiento, aunque la 
primera es el fundamento de la segunda. Finalmente, sostengo que ciertas funciones de 
la memoria necesitan ser presupuestas a un nivel trascendental, en el cual la memoria 
cumpliría una función fundamental con respecto a la posibilidad de la experiencia.
P a l a b r a s  c l av e :
Kant; memoria; conocimiento; imaginación; experiencia.
a b s t r a c t
This paper analyses the features of Kant’s view of memory, which Kant himself 
described explicitly in his lectures on anthropology and implicitly in the A edition of 
the Critique of Pure Reason. I shall offer a review of literature on Kant’s view of memory 
up to this day. I suggest that memory is a cognitive faculty that has the power to store 
and reproduce representations. Kant distinguishes among three different kinds of 
memorization which are relevant for human cognition. I offer reasons to hold that 
imagination and memory must be differentiated by their functioning, although the first 
one grounds the second one. Finally, I hold that certain functions of memory need to 
be presupposed at a transcendental level, in which memory would play a fundamental 
function with regard to the possibility of experience.
K e y w o r d s
Kant; memory; cognition; imagination; experience.
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Kant on Empirical and transcEndEntal  
Functions oF mEmoryi.
i. thE rEcEption oF Kant’s account oF mEmory
in currEnt litEraturE
In the last two decades, few commentators have recognized the 
importance of memory in Kant’s thought and recent studies on the 
empirical and transcendental function of memory are very scarce 
or lack profundity.1 It is, nonetheless, worth underlining some 
commentators like Herbert James Paton (1936) who defended 
the role of memory in the A edition of the Critique of Pure Reason 
and, particularly, in the “synthesis of recognition”.2 P. F. Straw-
son claimed later, in 1966, that experience and memory emerge 
together and that memory is involved in experience, recognition, 
consciousness, and identity of the self. More recently, Andrew 
Brook (1994) suggests that the transcendental function of memory 
may take place in the acts of the transcendental apperception. 
Howard Caygill (1995) maintains that memory is implied in two of 
the three syntheses of the ‘transcendental faculty of imagination’, 
namely in the synthesis of apprehension and recognition. Finally, 
Angelica Nuzzo (2015) argues for the seminal role of memory in 
the synthesis of recognition. 
1 This paper contains fragments that were taken from my PhD thesis, titled Time 
and Memory in Kant’s Theory of the Self. 
2 References to Kant’s works are by volume and page of Deutschen Akademie 
der Wissenschaften (ed.) (so-called Akademie edition), 1902–, Kants gesammelte 
Schriften, 29 vols., Berlin: Georg Reimer (later Walter De Gruyter) (AA). References 
to the Critique of pure Reason use the standard notation (CPR) followed by the pages of 
its first (1781) and second (1787) edition (A/B). Translations are from the Cambridge 
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant; it should be noted, nonetheless, that I have 
occasionally modified these translations. Where there is no reference to an English 
translation, the translation is my own. Here and throughout the thesis the gender‐
unspecific reference (mind, subject, human being) is made with the pronoun ‘it’ and 
its cognates.
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Gordon Nagel observes that “one of the striking “omissions” 
in Kant’s theory of experience is any significant role of memory 
in cognition. Memory, which figures so large in Locke and Hume, 
does not figure at all in the Critique” (Nagel, 1983, p. 215).3 To 
be precise, in his few explicit references to memory in the CPR, 
Kant (1998) claims that memory constitutes an empirical condition 
under which our understanding is exercised. 
Few commentators have explored in detail the possible role 
of memory in the a priori conditions of experience. For instance, 
G. Nagel is reluctant to admit the transcendental functions of 
memory in experience. Instead, he reduces memory to an empi-
rical function of storing or accumulation of sense materials which 
cannot be integrated into development of knowledge. Thus, he 
regards memory as unnecessary on the grounds that ‘the manifold 
of appearance’ occupies the same place as memory (memory taken 
for a reconstruction). This dismissal of memory is partly motivated 
by a self-sufficient signification of the concept ‘appearance’, accor-
ding to which “appearances are the stable correlates of the flux of 
sensory input. The buildup of knowledge is not the accumulation 
of sensory fact upon sensory fact, but the continual addition of 
details to a structure that obtains a priori” (Nagel, 1983, p. 215). 
However, I think that the replacement of ‘accumulation’ with 
‘continual addition’ does not mean that memory has necessarily a 
superfluous character, but it may be regarded as that a priori struc-
ture that prevents the appearance from losing (forgetting) every 
added detail in the flux of the sensory input. Nagel, nonetheless, 
ascribes a purely passive role of memory to Kant, by declaring that 
“the manifold of appearance is an active file, rather than an attic 
crammed with memories. It is under constant revision” (Nagel, 
1983, p. 215). In contrast, I shall argue (in the sixth section) that 
3 All references to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding will have the 
form ECHU, followed by book, chapter, and section numbers and the pagination in 
Locke (1959). 
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memory plays an active role in experience, via imagination, by 
storing and reproducing necessary items for experience.
P. F. Strawson suggests a more positive view on the role of 
memory in Kant’s account of experience as he points out a mutual 
dependence between memory and experience: “if experience is 
impossible without memory, memory also is impossible without 
experience. From whatever obscure levels they emerge they emer-
ge together” (Strawson, 1966, p. 112). Strawson says that memory 
is involved in “experience, recognition, consciousness, of identity 
of self through diversity of experience” (Strawson, 1966, p. 111). 
However, he does not explain how memory and these elements 
are connected with experience.
I think that the contribution of these commentators to the 
study of Kant’s view of memory is very partial, because they do 
not analyze in detail the role of memory in experience. Instead, 
they restrict their analysis to the CPR, overlooking places of the 
Anthropology4 where the relation between memory and experience 
is discussed. Given this restriction, my analysis of memory is much 
broader and richer than those undertaken hitherto.
ii. thE Empirical Function oF mEmory in cognition
According to Kant (2007a), memory is a faculty that involves 
fundamentally two distinct activities, namely to store and to re-
produce representations. These functions are based on experience 
and reveal the importance of memory in human cognition. In 
general terms, the capacity of people’s memory (without mental 
deficiencies or illnesses) to achieve these two acts varies according 
to their interest. For the more interesting an object is for the human 
being, the easier it will be to store it and reproduce it afterwards. 
Kant suggests that “one must occupy the memory only with those 
things which for us are important to remember and which have 
4 All references to Kant’s Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view (1798) will 
have this form (Anthropology).
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a relation to real life” (2007b, AA 9:473). Thus we should not 
memorize speeches or things that we learn for a short time (like 
a future examination), but rather we should memorize things that 
lead to one’s self-improvement. 
First, the storing function of memory consists in the capacity to 
preserve the existence of different kinds of representations over 
time, or, in his own words: “to grasp something methodically (me-
moriae mandare) is called memorizing” (Kant, 2007a, AA 7:183). 
Particularly, Kant’s distinction between ‘to memorize’ (memorie-
ren) and ‘to study’ (studieren) is at the basis of the difference bet-
ween learning philosophy and learning to philosophize. Learning 
philosophy means to learn thoughts or to imitate the judgements 
of others by memorizing them, whereas the human being who 
learns to philosophize ought to be led, not to be carried. The human 
being should be helped to walk on its own in the future and to 
exercise its understanding by using its own understanding. In 
fact, Kant thinks of philosophy from a practical point of view not 
as a ‘learning’ (Gelehrsamkeit) i.e. “the sum total of the historical 
sciences” (1996, AA 5:138 footnote), but rather as the science of 
the final ends of human reason (1900, AA 2:306; 25:978; 24:698; 
9:25; 1998, CPR A838/B866). 
Of course, Kant recognizes that learning can be involved in 
the act of understanding something and storing it in memory as 
he holds that catechist and historical knowledge, most of the times, 
is simply ‘assimilated’ (1900, AA 24:117, 149-50, 844). Mathema-
tical knowledge, by contrast, involves a more active role of the 
understanding, in so far as it is possible “to learn according to 
both types of knowledge. That is to say, it is possible to impress 
either on the memory or on the understanding that which can 
be presented to us as an already complete discipline” (1900, AA 
2:307). Kant favored the second kind of knowledge, arguing that 
philosophy is not a complete discipline that should be memori-
zed. Philosophy is, rather, a discipline that aims to extend the 
capacity of the understanding in young people, by means of the 
method of enquiry, to the extent that they become able to acquire 
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a more mature ‘insight’ (Einsicht) of their own (1900, AA 2:307; 
28:531, 534; 25:1037). However, this second type of knowledge 
does not exclude memory as it entails a comprehension of what 
is memorized. Thus, Kant does not disregard the role of memory 
within knowledge, but rather he suggests that the act of storing 
representations should be accompanied by the use of the unders-
tanding (1900, AA 25:1274, 979, 555). 
Both Rousseau and Kant defend the crucial role of memory 
in human cognition, for the former holds that “although memory 
and reasoning are two essentially different faculties, nevertheless 
the one develops truly only with the other” (Rousseau, 1979, 
p. 107). Similarly, Kant claims that “the use of reason is very 
necessary. For in order to learn, one needs memory and unders-
tanding, to apply what one has learned one needs judgment” 
(1900, AA 25:1481). In other words, Kant does not reject the 
storing of information but rather he suggests that such storing is 
a necessary condition for developing our human cognition pro-
perly (2007a, AA 7:184; 1900, 25:1274). This storing, nonetheless, 
should be accompanied by an appropriate use of the information 
by choosing, through the faculty of the power of judgement, the 
most proper knowledge according to every particular case. For 
pragmatic anthropology seeks to help the human being at both 
practical and theoretical levels, by increasing one’s capacity for 
memory. On this point, I am in agreement with Holly L. Wilson’s 
claim that “insofar as the anthropology teaches students how to 
increase their skills, it contributes to the useful development of 
the technical predisposition. Anthropology can also tell one what 
one ought not to do” (Wilson, 2011, p. 168). Kant’s approach 
to different ways of memorizing seeks the improvement of the 
human being’s cognitive faculty, which is essential for its life in 
community with others. 
Near the beginning of the Mrongovius anthropology lectures 
from 1784-1785, Kant claims that “memory is like an archivarius. A 
memory can be artfully organized if one places all representations 
in certain scientific fields where they belong; this is memoria localis” 
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(1900, AA 25:1273). Memory is not merely a passive receptacle, 
in which our representations are stored, but rather it is actively 
responsible for the distribution of the representations that will be 
retained and recalled later.
In the Logik Blomberg, Kant shows an outstanding interest for 
the key role of memory in cognition, as he points out that a large 
part of our cognitions (historical, geographical, physical, etc.) 
arises through belief, without which we would have no greater 
cognitions than those of the time in which we live, or those of the 
place where we live. It means that our cognition would be limited 
by our immediate experience. In contrast, our historical cognition 
is based on: a) the very experience of other people, as long as they 
are not in an extensive deception of the senses but they should 
be reliable, b) the non-defective memory, because we would not 
believe those whose imagination brings forth other images that 
do not belong to memory, c) capability to communicate their past 
experiences, so that these people should express themselves and 
communicate their experiences rightly and, finally, d) honorability 
and inclination toward truth (1900, AA 24:245-6).
Kant underlines the key role of memory for the human being 
at both theoretical and practical levels, otherwise his analysis would 
not be pragmatic. H. L. Wilson has correctly suggested that “what 
makes anthropology pragmatic is the use that it brings with it. It 
is useful to have more memory (…) knowing how to use a mne-
monic device will increase one’s capacity for memory” (Wilson, 
2011, p. 168). Memory becomes a crucial faculty of the human 
being, which is enhanced by both didactic practices of education 
and one’s moral aspirations (Svare, 2006). 
iii. Kinds oF mEmorization
Kant points out that to memorize is to ‘impress’ (einprägen) so-
mething in memory and distinguishes among three different kinds 
of memorizing: mechanical, ingenious and judicious (2007a, AA 
7:183; 1900, 25:976). I suggest that Rudolf A. Makkreel is incorrect 
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in his assertion that “the first method is rejected as too cumber-
some and the second as unreliable. What is needed is a remedial 
third method of judicious memorising” (Makkreel, 2014, p. 34). I 
think that Kant is not formulating a prescriptive judgement here, 
according to which the first two ways should be vanished; instead, 
Kant is describing different ways in which memory works. Indeed, 
Kant does not deny that ‘mechanical’ (mechanisch) memorizing 
plays a relevant role, for instance, in our ability to recite poems, 
neither that ingenious memorizing always makes less difficult the 
act of recalling, for instance when we associate someone’s name 
with a familiar object in order to recall it more easily. 
Accordingly, the mechanical memorizing is based on the fre-
quent ‘literal’ (buchstäblich) repetition. That is, when one performs 
the same action frequently, such action forms particular contents 
that are stored by memory in the same order in which they were 
experienced. This form is evident in the traditional way of learning 
multiplication tables and it is also relevant in sciences, principally 
in history of epochs (1900, AA 25:1463). To this form of memori-
zing belongs the recital of poems, the set of procedures demanded 
by a plane’s regular take-off and other actions, in which one must 
learn or store information with an exact order. Furthermore, the 
mechanical storing of contents in memory has its counterpart in 
the mechanical reproduction of memory contents. For it is a fact 
that memory has the power to reproduce or evoke contents with 
great accuracy, without a comprehension of what has been stored: 
What he merely learns, and thus entrusts to his memory, he 
performs only mechanically (according to laws of  reproductive 
imagination) and without understanding. A servant who has 
merely to pay a compliment according to a definite formula 
needs no understanding, that is, he does not need to think for 
himself. (Kant, 2007a, AA 7:197)
Kant suggests that common people often make use of this kind 
of memorizing, when they entrust various things, as lined up, to 
their minds, so that they can remember them and carry them out 
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in succession. Thus, the order in which representations are memo-
rized makes easier the preservation of the order in which they are 
reproduced, because no reasoning interferes with it. This is also 
suggested by Kant in the Blomberg Logic (1770s) where he holds 
that memory is concerned with no rational cognition, namely re-
presentations in which reason is not applied, which is not on that 
account irrational either (1900, AA 24:47). Thus, scholar people 
let many of his tasks or domestic affairs escape through distrac-
tion, because they have not caught them with enough attention. 
However, if there is not a good mechanical reliable memory, the 
art of writing can compensate for this deficiency as the latter has 
the power to recover precisely and without effort everything that 
should have been stored in the mind (1900, AA 7:184-5).5
Kant shows the positive and the negative sides of this form of 
memorizing for the biological development of the human being. 
On the one hand, this form of memorizing is not highly recom-
mended in young people, in as much as it hinders the participation 
of the understanding in learning. In this case, the understanding 
cannot act nor ‘make concepts’ (Begriffe machen) but is merely in-
active. On the other hand, this form of memorizing is not merely 
useful to obtain historical knowledge but it becomes indispensable 
for the human understanding, since memory provides the stuff 
in which the understanding occupies later. If memory is not well 
furnished, the understanding will be ‘poor’ (arm) and will not 
have any stuff, provided by senses nor reproduced by memory, for 
working (1900, AA 25:976, 92, 521, 1273). Memory of young 
people, by contrast, can retain more easily than old people’s one 
because it is more receptive (1900, AA 24:522, 816). 
To sum up, this form of memorizing involves the following 
essential characteristics: i) the subject is fully aware of the stored 
(memorized) representations, ii) the stored representations are 
short-term memories, iii) these do not demand comprehension, 
5 See, e.g., Krüger (1756, §73, pp. 218-9).
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iv) these contain practical information that has a relatively im-
mediate application and v) these contain linguistic properties, 
in so far as most of the Kant’s examples are related to word for 
word repetition.
The second form of memorizing is called ‘ingenious’ (ingeniös), 
by means of which we store a representation, by associating it 
with others already stored: “ingenious memorizing is a method 
of impressing certain ideas on the memory by association with 
correlative ideas that in themselves (as far as understanding is con-
cerned) have no relationship at all with each other” (Kant, 2007a, 
AA 7:183). This memorizing does not consist in a mere storing 
of representations, as it entails also an association of representa-
tions, in which we match the newly-stored representation with 
other similar previously-stored representation, by means of their 
‘comparison’. For instance, we memorize more easily someone’s 
name by associating it with the name of a quite known song or 
a certain familiar object (1900, AA 25:977, 1274; 29:757-8). Mo-
reover, Kant holds that ingenious memorizing is not a ‘ruleless 
procedure’ (regelloses Verfahren) of imagination but it involves 
rather a method according to which we pair together things that 
are not contained by the same concept in order to catch something 
in memory more easily. In my opinion, this form of memorizing 
exhibits the following essential characteristics: i) awareness of 
the already stored representations and of the representations that 
are to be memorized, ii) a comparison of stored and storable 
representations and iii) linguistic properties, in as much as these 
representations require the association of sounds of language. 
The third form of memorizing, called ‘judicious’ (judiciös), is 
not much concerned with the way in which certain representations 
are memorized but rather with the kind of information stored. 
According to this form, we memorize a system by enumerating 
and retaining its linked parts, so that if one of these parts were 
forgotten we could recall it by remembering the connection of that 
forgotten part with others still retained in memory: 
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Judicious memorizing is nothing other than memorizing, in 
thought, a table of  the divisions of  a system (for example, that 
of  Linnaeus) where, if  one should forget something, one can 
find it again through the enumeration of  the parts that one has 
retained; or else through memorizing the sections of  a whole 
made visible (for example, the provinces of  a country on a map, 
which lie to the north, to the west, etc.). (2007a, AA 7:184) 
This form of memorizing does not involve isolated representa-
tions but representations located in certain relations, for it consists 
in the storing of the specific relation among some representations.6 
For instance, we remember the place of a book more easily, when 
we classify all books according to a framework for universal 
concepts (called common places) and we put them under certain 
labels.7 Kant holds that judicious memorizing requires functions of 
the understanding which are useful for imagination. Therefore, if 
some representations are stored via this form of memorizing, they 
will exhibit the following essential characteristics: i) they require 
the activity of the understanding and of imagination, ii) they are 
useful for an immediate-practical activity as well as a theoretical 
one (e.g. useful for botanic), iii) they are long-term memories and 
iv) they involve linguistic properties, in as much as the latter two 
characteristics presuppose an enduring classification through a 
framework for general concepts.
6 This form of memorizing can be traced back to Simonides, the pre-Socratic 
Greek Lyric, considered by Cicero as the inventor of the art of memory, who thought 
that our memory of a fact could become more reliable if we remember orderly the 
arrangement of its localities (Cicero, 1967, pp. 353-4). 
7 Eckart Förster points out that “the classificatory systems of natural history, 
such as that of Linnaeus were not natural but rather artificial systems for memory in 
the tradition of the classical ‘memory trees’ and ‘memory theaters” (Förster, 1993, 
pp. 258-9 footnote 15). 
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iV. mEmory and imagination 
Kant, under the influence of Wolff, defines the “power of imagi-
nation’ (Einbildungskraft) as ‘a faculty of intuition without the pre-
sence of the object” (2007a, AA 7:167; 1998, CPR A120 footnote, 
B151-2).8 Kant distinguishes between productive and reproductive 
imagination; the first one is a faculty of the original presentation 
of the object, which not only precedes but also makes experien-
ce possible as it grounds space and time. The second one, by 
contrast, is concerned with a derivative presentation of empirical 
objects. The reproductive imagination contains both fantasy and 
memory, in as much as they demand the act of recalling represen-
tations. Fantasy, understood as an ‘inventive’ (dichtend) power 
of imagination, produces images based on ‘sense representation’ 
(Sinnenvorstellung) that was previously given to our faculty of sense 
(2007a, AA 7:167-8; 1900, 25:981). Unlike memory, imagination 
does not have to relate representations in a temporal order that 
corresponds necessarily to the temporal order in which the events 
were experienced (1900, AA 29:881). On this basic point, I am 
in agreement with R. Bader on considering that “the memory 
is what one is aware of and which exists NOW, whereby the 
8 Wolff holds similarly that “the faculty of producing perceptions of sensible 
absent things is termed faculty of imagining or imagination. For the soul is also capable 
of reproducing ideas of absent things” (Wolff, 1968, §92, my translation) (“Facultas 
producendi perceptiones rerum sensibilium absentium Facultas imaginandi seu lmagi-
natio appellatur. Quoniam itaque anima rerum absentium ideas reproducere valet”). 
Wolff also distinguishes between sensitive and intellectual memory. The first one is the 
faculty of recognizing confusedly reproduced ideas and things represented through 
these ideas; the second one is the faculty of recognizing distinctly the reproduced 
ideas (Wolff, 1972, §279). Furthermore, it seems that imagination and memory are 
not at the same level but imagination occupies a ‘lower part’ of the soul than memory 
(Mei, 2011). R. Brandt suggests that Wolff admitted the reproductive imagination, al-
beit he did not distinguish between memory and fantasy within the reproductive ima-
gination as Kant did it (Brandt, 1999). These two kinds of memory were preserved 
by Baumgarten’s Metaphysica (2013, §579). Kant uses, the term intellectual (1900, AA 
15:148) and sensitive memory (1900, AA 25:92, 319-20), although he does not explain 
their meaning. Brandt suggests that Kant replaces the sensitive memorizing with the 
mechanic one (Brandt, 1999).
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memory has representational content consisting in a temporally 
ordered sequence of remembered mental episodes” (Bader, 2017, 
p. 134). Indeed, Memory allows us to make causal judgements 
about past episodes in our life, by connecting some earlier events 
(cause) with other later ones (effect). For instance, I can infer via 
memory that the displeasure of a friend was caused by an earlier 
negative comment expressed by me.
On Kant’s picture, remembrances and imaginary ideas (fictions) 
should be differentiated by the faithful or unfaithful character of 
their content rather than by the way in which they appear in the 
mind (Dietrich, 1991). For in both cases some representations 
appear in the mind as soon as they are recalled: 
The power of  imagination is richer and more fruitful in 
representations than sense, when a passion appears on the 
scene the power of  imagination is more enlivened through the 
absence of  the object than by its presence. This is evident when 
something happens that recalls the representation of  an object to 
the mind again, which for a while seemed to be erased through 
distractions. (2007a, AA 7:180)
Imagination contents are initially extracted from experience 
but afterwards they are associated in different ways to form ‘new’ 
representations (1900, AA 28:236; 29:884); for instance, we imagine 
a stove with ears, by associating two or more images derived from 
experience. Kant underlines that “no matter how great an artist, 
even a sorceress, the power of imagination may be, it is still not 
creative, but must get the material for its images from the senses” 
(2007a, AA 7:168-9; 1998, CPR B278). It follows that a person who 
was born blind cannot make any colors comprehensible, because its 
imagination does not have the power to produce a representation 
without using the material that was previously given to the faculty 
of sense. Of course, Kant is aware of the fact that these images of 
imagination do not have reference necessarily to an actual external 
object, but they are remembrances of empirical intuitions, which 
can hardly be universally communicated (2007a, AA 7:168-9).
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Memory must be distinguished from imagination (understood 
as fantasy) by the fact that memory contents should be faithful 
and should reproduce intuitions (‘intuitive remembrances’) as 
they were arranged in the original conditions: 
Memory is distinguished from the merely reproductive power 
of  imagination in that it is able to reproduce the former 
representations voluntarily, so that the mind is not a mere 
plaything of  the imagination. Fantasy, that is, creative power 
of  imagination, must not mix in with it, because then memory 
would be unfaithful. (2007a, AA 7:182)
Accordingly, forgetfulness is not considered as a sort of un-
faithful memory. The term unfaithful means rather to remember 
falsely something, that is to say, to remember the occurrence of 
something that never happened (1900, AA 25:1463, 980). Again, 
memory should preserve the same temporal order of the originally 
stored representations.
However, in the Mrongovius anthropology lectures, Kant des-
cribes memory as tantamount to the power of imagination that 
aims at present time (1900, AA 25:1277). Afterwards, in the Busolt 
anthropology lectures from 1788-1789, he claims that memory is 
the faculty of the power of imagination to reproduce representa-
tions which one already has (1900, AA 25:1462). In the CPR, Kant 
confesses that it is unclear whether these faculties are identical: 
Initially a logical maxim bids us to reduce this apparent variety as 
far as possible by discovering hidden identity through comparison 
and seeing if  imagination combined with consciousness may 
not be memory, wit, the power to distinguish, or perhaps even 
understanding and reason. (1998, CPR A649/B677)
This confusion concerning the boundaries between memory 
and imagination is puzzling, as Kant’s descriptions of memory 
and imagination share similar aspects. For instance, both are 
tightly connected with sensibility and they are capable of forming 
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associations among empirical representations. This has led John 
Llewelyn naturally to claim that
Kant’s singling out of  reproduction as a power specifically of  
imagination reflects the already mentioned duality in the history 
of  philosophy, according to which memory is sometimes listed 
as a faculty in its own right and sometimes subsumed under 
imagination as one of  the ways in which the latter represents 
something absent. (Llewelyn, 2000, p. 107)
As Llewelyn notices, both imagination and memory rely on 
material derived from senses, although they are engaged with re-
presentations that do not demand the current presence of objects 
in sensibility.9 I suggest that the compelling boundary between 
memory and imagination does not consist much in the act through 
which the mind generates memory and imagination contents, but 
rather in the formal (temporal order) and material (material derived 
from senses) character of their content. That is to say, memory 
contents should correspond accurately to the events informed by 
our experience.
Furthermore, Kant distinguishes in several places of his lectures 
on anthropology between memory and imagination and suggests 
that memory’s functions depend upon imagination (2007a, AA 
7:182; 1900, 25:1289, 1464, 511, 974, 1023). Memory is described 
as a faculty that, only via imagination, has the power to achieve 
three ‘actions’ (Handlungen) in the reproduction of representations, 
namely to grasp something, to retain it and to remember it (1900, 
AA 25:89). 
Memory is not a self-sufficient power of the human being but 
is linked to the ‘re-collective’ (zurückrufend) power of imagina-
tion which brings back to the mind representations that it had 
9 Kant recognizes that a ‘disturbed’ (gestörte) faculty of remembrance, in some 
cases, deceives the afflicted person through chimerical representations of previous 
states that actually never happened (1900, AA 2:267).
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previously (2007a, AA 7:167). Kant stresses that imagination 
and memory are determined by ‘choice’ (Willkühr), so that when 
we want to remember, our choice enhances our imagination or 
memory to recall representations of previous states (1900, AA 
25:974). As a result, memory is nothing but “the capacity to avail 
oneself of one’s reproductive power of imagination voluntarily” 
(1900, AA 25:1273). On the contrary, fantasy involuntarily brings 
back to the mind previous images, just like a stream of images 
that flow incessantly (1900, AA 25: 521,314, 87; 15:126; 28:237; 
2007a, 7:174-5, 180). 
Furthermore, memory leans on the reproductive imagination, as 
long as the latter contains certain characteristics that are relevant 
for memory processes (Stephenson, 2017). In this vein, reproduc-
tive imagination is nothing but “a faculty of the derivative pre-
sentation of the object (i.e. exhibitio derivativa), which brings back 
to the mind an empirical intuition that it had previously” (2007a, 
AA 7:167). It means that memory via reproductive imagination re-
collects representations that we had previously (1900, AA 25:974, 
1464, 521), although the imagination’s power to reproduce past 
representations does not happen by chance but is conditioned by 
a contingent law of association among our representations (1900, 
AA 28:236; 29:883; 25:1272-3; 1998, CPR B152). This law of asso-
ciation states that “empirical ideas that have frequently followed 
one another produce a habit in the mind such that when one idea 
is produced, the other also comes into being” (2007a, AA 7:176). 
For instance, when we look at the scars of one’s body, we tend 
to reproduce, through the reproductive activity of imagination, 
memories or images of the circumstances in which these scars 
happened (1900, AA 25:1023; 2007a, 7:176). This has led P. Kit-
cher to take memory for an example of “a synthetic connection 
between states, since the contents of the later depend upon those 
of the earlier state. By contrast transcendental syntheses are those 
syntheses governed by nonassociative rules that are necessary for 
knowledge” (Kitcher, 1990, p. 254 footnote 14). This synthetic 
connection is certainly an empirical act performed by imagination 
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which differs from the transcendental synthesis achieved by the 
understanding.
Kant had already recognized the reliance of memory on 
imagination in the Friedländer lectures from 1775/1776, where 
he holds that memory is a faculty of imitation (i.e. reproductive 
image formation) which produces images (1900, AA 25:511). 
In brief, remembrances are images, reproduced by imagination, 
of the previous state of an object. The images derived from the 
apprehension of the state of the object are stored in memory and 
then reproduced by means of imagination. However, the remem-
brances of that previous state do not necessarily correspond to 
the current state of the changing object. In other words, we form 
images of what (objects) strikes the senses through sensibility, and 
these images become current remembrances10 of past states of the 
object, which may no longer exist. 
V. thE transcEndEntal Function oF mEmory 
In the first edition of the “Transcendental Deduction” (TD), Kant 
explains how a completely a priori concept can be related to an 
object of a possible experience. He is presenting here “the trans-
cendental constitution of the subjective sources that comprise the 
a priori foundations for the possibility of experience.” (1998, CPR 
A97). In his view, the relation between the manifold of an intui-
tion of an object and its corresponding a priori concept becomes 
possible by means of a threefold synthesis, which is necessarily 
found in all cognition. My aim is to argue that memory plays a 
role in these syntheses, but it is necessary first to consider previous 
approaches to this problem.
10 There is no conflict between the temporal positions of a memory (i.e. remem-
brance) in the present and of its content in the past. Thus A. Brook suggests rightly 
that “memories, however, are current representations, not past ones; I am not now 
directly aware of earlier stages of anything” (Brook, 1994, p. 186); see also Bader, 
(2017).
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In “Self-Identity” (1929), H. J. Paton suggests that experience 
relies on ‘one’ synthesis that demands memory functions. Concer-
ning the threefold synthesis, he emphatically asserts that “there is 
really only one synthesis—which we are describing here in frag-
ments (abgesondert und einzeln). I doubt also whether it is necessary 
to speak of a reproduction in imagination. All that we require is 
memory” (Paton, 1929, p. 316). Unfortunately, Paton’s article 
is not focused on Kant’s account of memory but rather on other 
authors, such as Bertrand Russell or Charlie Dunbar Broad. Later 
on, in 1936, Paton defended the role of memory in the synthesis of 
recognition, by which the manifold of intuition is “combined” into 
one object (Paton, 1936). He even suggests that all knowledge of 
objects demands not only to reproduce but also to remember a series 
of given appearances, which refers to the order in which these 
appearances were given to the mind (Paton, 1936). In a similar 
manner, Howard Caygill endorses the relevance of memory for 
the syntheses of apprehension and recognition:
Memory is implied in two of  the three syntheses of  the 
‘transcendental faculty of  imagination’ presented in the deduction 
of  CPR: in the ‘synthesis of  apprehension’ where it informs the 
consistency of  appearances, and in the ‘synthesis of  recognition’ 
where it is implied in the continuity of  the consciousness of  
appearances. (Caygill, 1995, pp. 290-1)
However, Caygill’s study of memory is too brief and cannot 
explain in detail how memory and imagination are connected in 
experience. In this vein, Andrew Brook claims that “in TD, he 
[Kant] hardly mentions memory (his discussion of the synthesis 
of recognition is a rare exception and even there memory appears 
only by implication)” (Brook, 1994, p. 186). Although he does 
admit that “many, perhaps all acts of TA [transcendental apper-
ception] make use of memory (…) to have certain sorts of repre-
sentations we must be able to retain earlier representations and/
or their objects, bring them forward, and synthesize them with 
current ones” (1994, p. 186). Brook also recognizes the importance 
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of memory in the synthesis of recognition, for “in order to synthesize 
earlier representations with current ones, we must be able to recall 
the earlier representations and recognize their relation to current 
ones” (1994, p. 186). In Brook’s view, the act of ‘recalling’ is only 
possible with the aid of memory, albeit the memory of the earlier 
representation should belong to the same consciousness (like any 
current representation). Otherwise, we would not have access to 
each particular representation. In a similar sense, Angelica Nuzzo 
argues for the seminal role of memory in the third synthesis:
To this extent, memory is crucial to the application of  concepts, 
that is, to the constitution of  the cognitive synthesis. (…) The 
consequence is that in the first CPR, Kant transcendentally 
deconstructs the function of  memory. Now memory (i) 
somehow acquires a transcendental function in connection with 
the imagination (already in constituting the cognitive synthesis). 
(Nuzzo, 2015, p. 190)
I am in agreement with Nuzzo, who correctly focuses on the 
transcendental function of memory and on the relation between 
memory and imagination. Unfortunately, the latter attempts 
overlook Kantian anthropological description of memory, so 
that they cannot show how memory is involved in the possibility 
of experience. Again, I argue for the relevance of memory in the 
threefold synthesis.
In his analysis of the threefold synthesis, Kant emphasizes 
that all representations belong to inner sense and, therefore, the-
se should be brought into relations of time, because time is the 
form of inner sense. The empirical intuition is nothing but the 
effect of the synthesis of apprehension, so that the manifold given in 
sensibility is apprehended as an ‘intuition’ only, if we distinguish 
the time of that manifold, by going through it and taking it together 
(1998, CPR A99). It is well-grounded to assert that the act of taking 
the manifold together would not be possible, if each element of the 
manifold (through which we go through) were forgotten while we 
are successively apprehending them. Precisely, the very term ap-
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prehension entails the mind’s power to retain these empirical data, 
which would not be possible without a sort of sensitive memory.11
Second, Kant states that all successive apprehension of the ma-
nifold given in sensibility requires that each one of the apprehen-
ded representations should be reproduced, so that the preceding 
representation can be associated with the following one by means 
of a synthesis of reproduction in imagination (1998, CPR A101-2). 
But, how could that representation be reproduced without pre-
supposing a storing faculty in the human being? The answer is, 
in a way, sketched by S. Matherne, who notices the importance 
of the human being’s capacity of preserving empirical data in the 
synthesis of reproduction:
In order, for example, to produce a representation that reflects 
the different aspects of  the champagne flute, if  by the time I am 
representing its curviness I have forgotten all about its glint, then 
I cannot produce an image of  it. On Kant’s view, the synthesis of  
reproduction is the process through which representations in the 
past are brought to bear on what we are representing right now. 
(Matherne, 2015, p. 758)
11 In the Collins anthropology lectures from 1772-3, Kant, influenced by Wolff, 
admits the existence of a ‘sensitive memorizing’ (sensitive Memorieren) and in the Anthro-
pology holds that memory and the faculty of foresight are ‘sensible’ (sinnlich), so that 
these belong to sensibility (1900, AA 25:92; 2007a, 7:182). Christian Wolff says in his 
Psichologia Rationalis: “I name sensitive the memory that draws out what has been ori-
ginated by sense” (Wolff, 1972, §279) (“sensitivam appello, quae a sensu ortum trahit”) 
and he adds that this kind of memory belongs to animals as well: “animal memory or 
sensitive consists in apperception of the same idea contained, so to speak, in several series of percep-
tions” (1972, §280) (“memoria animalis seu sensitiva in apperceptione eiusdem ideae tanquam 
in diversis perceptionum seriebus contentae consistit”). However, the corporeal and intellec-
tual distinction can be traced back, at least, to Descartes, who claimed in a 1640 letter 
to Mersenne: “I think that it is the other parts of the brain, especially the interior parts, 
which are for the most part utilized in memory. I think that all the nerves and muscles 
can also be so utilized, so that a lute player, for instance, has part of his memory in his 
hands (…) but besides this memory, which depend on the body, I believe there is also 
another one, entirely intellectual, which depends on the soul alone” (Descartes, 1991, 
p. 146); see also Joyce (1997). Afterwards, in the Conversation with Burman (1648) Des-
cartes holds that the function of the intellectual memory is to recall universals, while that 
of the corporeal memory is to recall particulars (Descartes, 1991). 
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Despite of the fact that Kant is not much concerned with the 
retention of those representations but merely with their reproduc-
tion, it is plain that without a capacity to store and evoke those 
representations, there would be no stuff to be reproduced. Tom 
Rockmore barely notices the relation between memory and the 
synthesis of reproduction, by claiming that “Kant appears here 
to conflate the unconscious activity through which the synthesis 
of reproduction occurs with the problem of conscious memory” 
(Rockmore, 2012, p. 317). Thomas Powell offers further sugges-
tive remarks about the function of memory in the synthesis of 
reproduction, saying that “experience itself would be impossible if 
individual representations were not such that they could be repro-
duced in memory, synthesized in thought under object-concepts, 
or synthesized in some other way or ways” (Powell, 1990, p. 28). 
Powell correctly notices that the successive addition of parts in 
the apprehension depends upon the successive resonance of the 
reproduced part. In other words, the constitution of a series is 
impossible, if each added part were forgotten.
But, what is the status of a preceding representation in the 
successive series of apprehension? I answer that that representa-
tion cannot be given as an intuition in sensibility but rather as a 
particular remembrance. For the persistence of a past representation 
in sensibility over time would make the reproduction of that re-
presentation useless. On the contrary, it is precisely the fact that 
the representation (intuition) no longer exists in sensibility, which 
makes the reproduction in imagination necessary.
The apprehended representation in the synthesis of apprehension 
is reproduced as a remembrance in the synthesis of reproduction in 
imagination and it persists until is determined by the synthesis of 
recognition. As a result, considering that memory partakes in the 
conditions that make experience possible, it is well-grounded to 
say that intuition and the remembrance of an intuition should have a 
similar status. This status could be named “intuitive remembran-
ces” as long as it retains an almost immediate reference to these 
immediate impressions. Of course, the intuitive remembrance is 
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incompatible with a strong presence-dependence account of intui-
tion that demands “an actually existing object which is present 
to one in the intuition of it” (McLear, 2017, p. 89). However, 
these could be compatible with a moderate presence-dependence 
one, according to which “an intuition only depends on the actual 
presence of an object for the initial intuition, but not necessarily for 
subsequent ones” (McLear, 2017, p. 90). These intuitive remem-
brances are precisely produced by empirical objects which are 
not present now. 
Furthermore, A. C. Ewing (1967) suggests that memory is 
capable of supplementing present representation in the synthesis of 
recognition. Since memory is grounded on imagination and “ima-
gination is the faculty for representing an object even without its 
presence in intuition”12 (1998, CPR B151). It follows that memory 
contents would become a quasi-intuition. This has led Andrew 
Stephenson to claim that
Imaginational episodes—as occur, for example, in memory, 
dreams, and hallucination—involve the intuition of  objects that 
are not, in the relevant sense, present (…) Intuition therefore does 
not require the existence or presence of  its objects and is in no 
substantial sense object-dependent. (Stephenson, 2017, p. 105) 
Stephenson characterizes memories as imaginational episodes, 
which are related to cognitive states like belief and knowledge. 
He nonetheless, is not committed with a study of memory as a 
12 As A. Stephenson suggests (2017, pp. 112-4), this ambiguous sentence lea-
ves two interpretations open: i) imagination represents an object that is not given 
in intuition and ii) imagination represents in intuition an object that is not given, 
that is, imagination introduces a representation to intuition. Both are plausible. I 
advocate for the second one, because it is coherent with the suggested cognitive role 
of memory through imagination. Kant emphasizes the cognitive role of productive 
imagination in experience as he holds that “the imagination is a necessary ingredient 
of perception itself” (CPR A120 footnote; on this point see Matherne (2015); Hanna 
(2005); Waxman (1991). Furthermore, Heidegger (1990) suggests that the transcen-
dental power of imagination is the root of sensibility and understanding.
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necessary condition under which experience is possible. On my 
account, memory stores and reproduces the stuff that is involved 
in the action of the understanding via the synthesis of recognition. 
The power of memory to preserve the intuitive remembrances 
rests on imagination, which is an internal condition under which 
the synthesis of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition is 
possible. In other words, the role of memory in experience can 
be reconstructed from the relation of two ideas. First, sensibility 
has two parts: senses that generate intuitions of existing objects 
and imagination that generates intuitions even in the absence of an 
existing object (2007a, AA 7:153, 167; 1998, CPR B151; 1900, AA 
18:619). Second, the functioning of memory is grounded on ima-
gination, so that memory and imagination are tightly connected 
in the retention and retrieval of the stuff involved in the threefold 
synthesis (2007a, AA 7:182; 1900, 25:1289, 1464). 
Furthermore, Kant holds in the CPR that “from the fact that 
the existence of outer objects is required for the possibility of a 
determinate consciousness of our self it does not follow that every 
intuitive representation of outer things includes at the same time 
their existence” (1998, CPR B278). Kant is asserting here that even 
if our cognition of the existence of outer objects involves empirical 
intuition, we possess intuitive representations of them, without 
assuming necessarily the current existence of an object in sensi-
bility. These intuitive representations are based on the capacity 
of imagination to achieve a sensory reproduction (Hanna, 2005). 
For Kant suggests that the power of imagination is the substitute 
of the senses, so that it is nothing but the faculty of intuitions in 
the absence of objects. In this vein, imagination is tantamount to 
memory as it has the power to reproduce the past absent objects 
(1900, AA 28:673-4). That is to say, that possession “is possible 
merely through the reproduction of previous outer perceptions, 
which, as has been shown, are possible only through the actua-
lity of outer objects” (1998, CPR B278). Therefore, memory can 
provide intuitive representations whose existence is involved in 
the threefold synthesis. Since memory is involved in the synthesis 
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of reproduction, which constitutes a transcendental action of the 
mind, then one might say that memory is a hidden transcendental-
working faculty. However, Kant is not very interested in the act 
of storing representations but in their reproduction, which takes 
place in imagination. The synthesis of reproduction in imagination 
is an a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity of appearances, 
so that it will belong to the transcendental actions of the mind 
(1998, CPR A102).
However, I disagree with A. Brook’s view that the synthesis of 
reproduction does not require memory, as long as that synhesis 
is just a matter of retaining earlier intuitions in such a way that 
it allows a transition between the later and the earlier represen-
tation. I think that he misses the fundamental question of why 
an “earlier intuition” should be still regarded as an “intuition” 
at all. He suggests that “such transitions are simply the result 
of acquiring an association (which, moreover, could be entirely 
nonconscious). This is not memory and does not even require 
memory” (Brook, 1994, p. 127). Unlike Brook, I believe that the 
association is not an association of the same elements, namely 
the ‘intuition A’ with the successive ‘intuition B’, but rather the 
‘remembrance of the intuition A’ with the ‘intuition B’. Since the 
reproduction (remembrance) of A is not achieved by sensibility but 
by memory, then, the association must depend upon memory’s 
power to preserve and reproduce the remembrance of the intuition 
A through imagination (Prichard, 1909). Therefore, I support J. 
Bennet’s idea that imagination can be identified with memory 
in the synthesis of recognition: “imagination, then, is closely 
connected-if not identical with intellectually disciplined memory. 
Kant there is expounding his view that the rational grasp of one’s 
present experience requires the relating of it with remembered past 
experience” (Bennet, 1966, p. 136). 
Third, the synthesis of recognition in the concept declares that all 
reproduction in the series of representations (synthesis of repro-
duction) would be futile without the ‘consciousness’ (Bewußtsein) 
of the fact that the reproduced representation in imagination is 
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not different from the manifold that has been apprehended as 
intuition. It seems reasonable to ask whether the reproduced 
representation could coincide with the apprehended one without 
presupposing memory as a faculty that preserves the existence of 
the former, during the act by which the mind recognizes that these 
representations belong to the same object. I do not think that this 
is possible. On the contrary, memory is required for the synthesis 
of recognition and Kant is aware of that condition as he warrants 
that we should not forget the added units in the ‘composing’ of 
intuitions:
If, in counting, I forget that the units that now hover before 
my senses were successively added to each other by me, then 
I would not cognize the generation of  the multitude through 
this successive addition of  one to the other, and consequently I 
would not cognize the number; for this concept consists solely 
in the consciousness of  this unity of  the synthesis. (1998, CPR 
A103; my emphasis) 
The synthesis of a manifold by a concept is tantamount to 
the consciousness of its unity and without such consciousness, 
provided by the concept, neither the apprehension, nor the repro-
duction could provide representations of objects for us (Gibbons, 
1994). To my knowledge, the consciousness of the fact that the 
(past) reproduced and the (present) apprehended representations 
are ‘identical’ relies on memory, in as much as it preserves the 
existence of the reproduced representations sufficiently to make 
the consciousness of this identity possible. For Kant declares 
that “without consciousness that that which we think is the very 
same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in 
the series of representations would be in vain. For it would be 
a new representation in our current state” (1998, CPR A103). 
Thus, the manifold of the representation only becomes a ‘whole’ 
(Ganzes) or a ‘unity’ (Einheit) when we reach the consciousness 
of this identity. In contrast, if we do not presuppose the existence 
of memory, all the representations, which are reproduced, would 
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be forgotten and hence experience would be merely a set of new 
unrelated representations (1900, AA 25:1462). In strict sense, one 
must conclude that without memory there would be no intuitions 
in plural, as long as plurality would entail that we recognize that 
the past representation is different from the present one. This 
recognition, hence, would demand the preservation of represen-
tations whose comparison leads us to recognize the difference or 
identity among representations. On this basic point, I agree with 
Nuzzo as she claims that
The third synthesis implies first the memory of  past 
representations, and second the recognition that earlier and 
later representations are related as representations of  the same 
object; and this requires the concept as a rule, which allows 
memory to repeat its orderly recalling and comparing of  past 
representations. (Nuzzo, 2015, p. 190)
The synthesis of recognition involves the consciousness of both 
unity and identity of the manifold of our empirical representations; 
thus, this consciousness must always be found, even if it lacks cons-
picuous clarity (1998, CPR A104). Kant goes on to claim that the 
transcendental condition of the unity of the consciousness in the 
synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions is the transcendental 
unity of apperception (1998, CPR A106-7). Furthermore, this unity of 
consciousness is grounded on the consciousness of the identity of 
the function by means of which the empirical manifold is syntheti-
cally connected into one cognition. This leads Kant to claim that 
“the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself 
is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity 
of the synthesis of all appearances in accordance with concepts” 
(1998, CPR A108). It follows that the self-consciousness is meant 
to be a condition of our cognition of objects (Schulting, 2015).
Again, memory performs a transcendental function, insofar 
as it is necessarily involved in the transcendental syntheses of 
apprehension, reproduction and recognition. Thus, our knowledge of 
appearances in general would not be possible without memory, 
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for it demands a synthetic unity of the apprehended manifold in 
intuition. However, this apprehension does not suffice to gua-
rantee the existence of this knowledge, but it requires both the a 
priori reproduction of the manifold and the presence of concepts in 
which that manifold is unified (1998, CPR A105). Yet, despite the 
skeptical view of A. Brook on the role of memory in the first and 
second synthesis, he is optimistic about the relevance of memory 
in the third one, by recognizing memory and consciousness as 
two components of the synthesis of recognition:
Synthesis by recognition requires two things. One is memory 
— true memory, that is to say, recovery and recognition of  past 
representations as past, not just associative reproduction. The 
other, of  course, is ‘consciousness’, that is to say, recognition 
— something in the past representations must be recognized as 
related to present ones. (Brook, 1994, p. 129)
An object of cognition can only be constituted as such, if 
our mind is capable of unifying its disperse components, whose 
existence is preserved by our memory, through the consciousness 
of the identity of those components. For “[a merely reproduced] 
manifold would never constitute a whole, since it would lack the 
unity that only consciousness can obtain for it” (1998, CPR A103). 
Cognition, according to Kant, demands a synthesis of representa-
tions related in time and this would not be possible, if our mind 
were not capable of remembering and, therefore, recognizing 
the connection between earlier and later representations. Brook 
emphasizes that when our mind recognizes that the earlier and 
later representations represent the same object, we use then “a 
concept of number, a concept of quality, a concept of modality, 
and, of course, the specific empirical concept for the object we 
are cognizing” (Brook, 1994, p. 129). Finally, if we take into ac-
count that, according to Kant, memory leans on imagination and 
memory plays a transcendental role, then, the power of memory 
to reproduce representations will be a transcendental act of the 
mind. For the acts of storing and reproduction of representations 
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are demanded by the threefold synthesis, which is a necessary 
condition of experience. 
i. conclusion 
Kant’s theory of memory is not systematic like other aspects of 
his philosophy, but it is composed by elements that belong to the 
anthropological sphere, or to the transcendental one. Memory 
turns out to be a dynamic cognitive faculty that stores, organizes 
and reproduces representations derived from experience. Mo-
reover, memory depends on the productive imagination, which 
conditions experience, as long as it is at the basis of the formation 
of empirical intuition in general. Thus, it is quite reasonable to 
claim that experience cannot be possible without memory and 
his allusion to memory in the threefold synthesis is a sing of its 
relevance in experience. 
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